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Monday, May 10, 2010

MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAJEMEN LABA DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN

Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAJEMEN LABA
DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN
( Studi Pada Perusahaan go publik Sektor Manufaktur )

MUH. ARIEF UJIYANTHO
STIE Muhammadiyah Pekalongan
BAMBANG AGUS PRAMUKA
Universitas Jenderal Soedirman Purwokerto

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanism, namely institutional ownership, managerial ownership, presence of independent of director and size of director to earnings management. This study also examines influence concequensies of earnings management to financial performance. This study takes sample from 30 companies in the manufacturing sector at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which were published in financial report from 2001-2004. The method of analysis of this research used multi regression and single regression.

The results of this study show that (1) institutional ownership had not significant influence to earnings management, (2) managerial ownership had negative significant influence to earnings management, (3) presence of independent of director had positive significant influence to earnings management, (4) size of director had not significant influence to earnings management, (5) simultaneously of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, presence of independent of director and size of director had significant influence to earnings management, and (6) earnings management had not significant influence to financial performance.

Key Words: Corporate Governance Mechanism, Earnings Management, Financial Performance

I. INTRODUCTION

In agency theory (agency theory), the agency relationship arises when one or more persons (principals) hire another person (agent) to provide a service and then delegate authority to the agent the decision-making (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Manager as the manager of the company know more internal information and the company's prospects in the future than the owners (shareholders). Therefore, as manager, the manager is obliged to give a signal about the condition of the company to the owners. However, sometimes the information is not received in accordance with the actual condition of the company. This condition is known as asymmetric information or asymmetric information (asymmetric information) (Haris, 2004). Asymmetry between management (agent) with the owners (principals) can provide the opportunity for managers to manage earnings (earnings management) (Richardson, 1998).

Measures of earnings management has led to several cases of accounting reporting scandals, is widely known, among others, Enron, Merck, World Com and the majority of other companies in the United States (Cornett, Marcuss, Saunders and Tehranian, 2006). Some cases that occurred in Indonesia, including PT. Lippo Tbk and PT. Kimia Farma Tbk also involve financial reporting (financial reporting) which originated from undetected manipulation (Gideon, 2005).


*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar*
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