Updates @EkyDakka.Com (Jurnal SNA 6 - 13)

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Friday, April 30, 2010

Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan....

Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar


Politeknik YDHI Yogyakarta

Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta


This research aims to give empirical evidence concerning earnings management in firms violating debt covenant and to test whether earnings management in those firms are larger than that in control firms. Research population is manufacturing company listed at Bursa Efek Jakarta. The sample includes 13 firms violating debt covenant and 20 firms as control firms. The sampling method is purposive sampling. Method of statistics used is t-test.

The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is not significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that there are other factors besides violation of debt covenant that motivate management to perform earnings management.

Keywords: Earnings Management, Debt Covenant Hypothesis, Debt Covenant Violation, Discretionary Accruals.

* This research is a principal investigator in the Masters thesis, Saint Universitas Gadjah Mada. I offer the thanks to Prof.. Dr. Baridwan Zaki, M. Sc thesis as mentors for advice, time and discussion. AKPM-02 1

I. Background

Agency theory see the company as a nexus of contracts is an organization under contract with several parties such as contracts with shareholders, suppliers, employees (including managers) and other parties involved (Scott, 2000). The Company also has contractual ties with the creditors if the company is involved as one of the debt financing. Most companies use debt as the source of funding because it can improve performance of managers due to fears of job losses and if the performance increase, shareholders are willing to pay its share price is more expensive (Jensen and Meckling 1976 in Main 2000).

Companies that have debt contracts and other contracts would wish to minimize the cost associated with contract contract-contract (contracting theory), such as negotiation kos, kos monitoring contract performance, the possibility of renegotiation, and the cost estimates if bankruptcy or other failure (Scott , 2000). Therefore, we need a tool to assess the performance of companies in an effort to protect the interests of both parties are bound by a contract (to minimize conflicts of interest). The tool of any information generated internally by the company.
*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Pendeteksian Earnings Management (Detection of Earning Management)...


STIE Malangkucecwara, Malang


Earnings Management, underpricing and performance of company joining policy of IPO draw to be studied. Differ from research Husnan ( 1996) to research phenomenon of underpricing of moment IPO, Nasirwan ( 2002) testing performance of pasca IPO, and Candy ( 2002) testing performance operate for and the finance performance, this research extend examination to phenomenon of earnings management, underpricing and company performance ( finance, market) together.

As much 31 company conducting IPO in Jakarta Stock Exchange in research of during period 1990 up to 2001, with unit analysis of during 6 year consisted of 3 year before IPO and 3 year after IPO, so that there is 186 unit analysis.

Result of examination indicate that mean discretionary accrual is positive, what indication that company executing IPO of indication do policy of earnings management three year before IPO and three year after IPO by playing component accruals. But discretionary accrual before IPO and after IPO not differ, this matter indicate that company still continue policy of earnings management at least until three year after IPO.

Furthermore examination to underpricing using initial return ( Rt), proving that company executing IPO experience of underpricing on first when share traded in market sekunder. Mean of Initial return on first of trading in capital market is positive, even happened positive return until the third month a period of trading, afterthat happened degradation of return by the end of year (December).

Although there no difference which signifikan of performance of finance before and after IPO, result of examination prove that company executing IPO experience of degradation of performance of finance, whereas performance of market show there is difference of return [of] before IPO by return [is] first day [of] trading [in] Stock Exchange Market, and there is downhill tendency after IPO especially by the end of year.

If connected third the above phenomenon, in general the researcher cannot prove relation between policy earnings management, phenomenon underpricing, and the company market performance and finance performance conducting IPO.

Keywords: Initial Public Offerings (IPO), Earnings Management, underpricing and performance of company


Companies that will go public usually begins with a decision to conduct an initial public Offerings (IPO) conducted in the primary market (primary market). Subsequently, these shares will be traded in perjual-called capital market or secondary market (secondary market). Shares at an initial offering price is determined by agreement between the company issuers with securities underwriter (an underwriter) as the required funds, issuers want high initial price. Conversely, an underwriter as underwriter seeks to minimize the risk of bear. In this type of comitment full underwriting, the underwriter will purchase the shares not sold in the primary market. These circumstances make the underwriters are not willing to buy stocks that are not sold. Efforts is to negotiate with the issuer so that these shares are not too high a price, even likely underpriced.

Underpricing is an interesting phenomenon because it experienced by most of the world's capital markets. Since it is often in the primary market (IPOs) are found of underpricing (Ritter, 1991; McGuinnes, 1992; Husnan, 1993; Aggrawal, et al., 1993; Ernyan and Husnan, 2002). Research conducted by Aggrawal, et Al. (1993) concluded that the IPO in the short term indicated the occurrence of underpricing, but in the long term return that is negative going. This underpricing profitable investors on the one hand but on the other hand would be detrimental to the issuer because the funds collected are not maximal.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar


Universitas Brawijaya Malang


This study investigates the existence of earnings management motivations and strategies. Based on ordinary least square regression, this study indicates that debt covenant and political cost motivations affect earnings management. However, bonus plan motivation and accounting method choice strategy do not affect earnings management. Investigation on earnings management practices explains that bonus plan motivation affect income increasing, not income decreasing.

This study finds that the managers of public firms in Indonesia do not use accounting method choices as earnings management strategy. Some of them choose to use a little of accruals accounting flexibility and prefer both GAAP violations and intercompany transactions strategies. This study identifies that the motivations of debt covenant, political cost and owners’ wealth as well as the strategy of accruals accounting flexibility are earnings management practices with global value. Otherwise, earnings management practices with local value consist of motivation caused by both debt restructuring and going concern constraint and strategy through GAAP violations and intercompany transactions.

Key Words: Earnings management, Motivation, Bonus plan, Debt covenant, Political cost, Owners’ wealth, Debt restructuring, Going concern, Strategy, Accounting method choice, Accruals accounting flexibility, GAAP violations, Intercompany transactions, Global value, Local value

* The names of companies and related parties has been modified for the purposes of this research. We appreciates the various parties who have been providing input to this research.

The financial statements have been prepared on the accrual basis of accounting (accruals accounting). Accrual accounting has the advantage that the company's earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication about the economic performance of companies than the information generated from the aspects of current receipts and payments (FASB 1978). Accrual accounting also has weaknesses. Wild et al. (2003) criticized that accrual accounting is not perfect and the rules that obscure the financial report which aims to provide cash flow information and company capabilities in generating cash. Vagueness of this information due to accrual accounting is complicated and vulnerable to manipulation. This vulnerability is called management earnings (earnings management).

The presence of motivation and opportunities as incentives for managers to manage earnings. According to Scott (2000), motivation for earnings management include bonus plans, debt covenants, and political cost. Managers are motivated to manage earnings to achieve performance targets and bonus compensation, minimize the possibility of debt covenant violations, and minimize the political cost because of government intervention and the parliament.

* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Thursday, April 29, 2010

Influence of Corporate Governance (Pengaruh Corporate Governance)

Pengaruh Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Di Industri Perbankan Indonesia

Alumni Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Sebelas Maret

Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Sebelas Maret


The aims of this research at examining the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, such as, board of commisioner composition and size, and audit committee existence on the earnings management practice in public bank companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The samples of this research is all of public banks companies existed in Indonesia in the year of 2000-2004 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The research data were collected from public bank’s financial statement for the period of 2000 until 2004, from Indonesian Banking Directory published by Bank Indonesia from 2001 until 2005, and also from each company’s websites.

Purposive sampling method was used to determine research sample. From this method, we have collected 100 observations from 20 public banks companies/5 years. By using multiple regression analysis as the research method, the results shown that corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board of commisioner composition and size, and also audit committee existence influenced earnings management of public banks companies which have been detected by using specific accrual model from Beaver and Engel (1996).

These results mean those mechanisms done by the company have succeeded to minimize the earnings mangement practice. Therefore, based on these results we can conclude that corporate governance mechanisms have worked effectively to increase company’s performance.

Keywords: corporate governance, board of commisioner, audit committee, earnings management

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar

Year 2001 recorded in the financial scandal involving the manipulation of public company financial statements by PT Lippo Tbk and PT Kimia Farma Tbk (Boediono, 2005). It is proved that the practice of manipulation of financial reports is still being done by corporate party despite being away from the crisis period 1997-1998. One cause of this condition is the lack of implementation of corporate governance. Evidence showed weak corporate governance practices in Indonesia led to deficiencies in corporate decision-making and actions (Alijoyo et al., 2004).

Corporate governance is the concept proposed to improve business performance through supervision or monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability of management to the stakeholders with a framework based on rules. The concept of corporate governance as proposed for the achievement of corporate management more transparent to all users of financial statements. If this concept is applied properly it is expected that economic growth will continue to rise in line with the transparency of corporate management a better and will benefit many parties.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Activities And Financial Influence ...

Activity and Financial Literacy of Audit Committee Influence Against Type of Profit Management

Pengaruh Aktivitas Dan Financial Literacy Komite Audit Terhadap Jenis Manajemen Laba

Indonesian Universities


Audit committee is one component of the GCG Which exists in the company. Ins running on their tasks and functions in connection with financial reporting, the members of the audit committee is required to Communicate actively with internal and external parties and to have financial literacy in order to be Able to Increase the quality of company's financial statement.

Performed this research is to find the effect of the audit committee's effectiveness, in Which the effectiveness is from the perspective of input and process, to the type of company's earnings management, whether it is efficient or Opportunistic. The audit steering committee's effectiveness is Measured by the audit committees of GCG survey results from the index is developed by Arsjah Which (2005). In Addition to finding the effect of the audit committee's effectiveness, this research is Also Performed to find the effect of components of the audit committee's activity, its meeting with the company's internal (IAU) and the external auditor and Its financial literacy to the type of company's earnings management. More effective, active and financially literate audit committees are the Expected to Be Able to make the company's earnings management more efficient.

This research Finds That the audit committee's effectiveness from the perspective of the input and process is not Able to Make the company's earnings management more efficient. If We see from the component of the audit committee's activity, its meeting with the SPI is not proven to make the company's earnings management more efficient. Whilst the audit committee's meetings with external auditors and financial literacy have inconclusive results.

This research is Also using the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") index and the external auditors' index from a survey by Arsjah (2005), besides the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size, to find the effect of BOC's and external auditor's quality to the type of company's earnings management . This research Finds That BOC index index and external auditors tend to make the company's earnings management more efficient than the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size. It shows That the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size are not appropriate to be Used as a proxy of BOC and audit quality.

Keywords: audit committee,'s effectiveness, the audit committee's activity, financial literacy, earnings management.

The concept of good corporate governance (GCG), the more often mentioned by practitioners of business as one tool to prevent the financial big case that happened, for example the case of Enron (Alijoyo, 2002). One component that plays an important role in the process of implementation of GCG is an audit committee.

DeZoort et al. (2002) explains that an effective audit committee determined two things: 1) from the input side (the composition of the qualifications, competence and the amount of resources) and 2) of the process (must have a high work ethic). From the input and the process is expected to be an effective audit committee work so that it can produce an output in the form of financial statements, internal controls and risk management that can be trusted.

The financial statements of quality and trustworthy is a difficult thing to measure. One of the ways used by researchers to measure it is by seeing whether there is an earnings management practices by management in preparing its financial statements, a proxy for discretionary accruals (Xie et al. (2001), Chtourou et al. (2001), Bradbury et al. (2004), Parulian (2004), Wedari (2004)).

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Influence of Corporate Ownership Structure (Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Perusahaan)...

Effect of Ownership Structure And Corporate Parties-Party Transactions with Related Parties The Power Of Accounting Information

(Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Perusahaan Dan Transaksi Dengan Pihak-Pihak Yang Memiliki Hubungan Istimewa Terhadap Daya Informasi Akuntansi)



This research studies the effect of ownership structure and related party transactions on the informativeness of accounting numbers. Indonesian sample is interesting to be examined due to low quailty of accounting numbers, concentrated ownership, family control and high-dominant related party transactions. Using the model levels and changes models, studies show That this concentration of ownership increases informativeness of the accounting numbers to the capital market. However, concentrated ownership by family or the informativeness of accounting numbers decreases to the capital market. Further, the magnitude of related party transactions That has been earned or Used, as reported in one of income statement accounts, increases informativeness of accounting numbers. Otherwise, the magnitude of related party transactions That has not earned or Used, as reported in one of balance sheet accounts, Decrease informativeness of accounting numbers.

Key words: accounting information resources, concentration of ownership, family control, transactions with related parties


Since 1994, Indonesian accounting standards have been prepared with reference to internationally accepted accounting standards (Internatioanal Accounting Standards / IAS or converted into International Financial Reporting Standards / IFRS since 2001). However, several studies provide evidence that the quality of accounting information in Indonesia is still low. Based on the Price Water House Coopers survey in 1999 in the eyes of international investors, Indonesia is one of the worst countries in terms of "in standards of auditing and compliance, accountability to shareholders, standards of disclosure and transparency and Board processes (PWC, 1999). Graham and King (2000) discovered the power of information in accounting numbers to the market price is relatively low compared with Asian countries is another. Accounting information resources in Indonesia are under the state of the Philippines, Thailand and Korea. Leeuz et al. (2002) found that the level of earnings management in Indonesia is relatively high (ranked the 15th largest among the 31 countries) using data between 1990 and 1999. The ranking of earnings management in Indonesia to Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.

The low quality of accounting information in Indonesia, although it has been adopting international accounting standards is not only happening in Indonesia. Ball et al (2000) showed that the adoption of international accounting standards does not by itself guarantee a high level of transparency as has occurred in four countries: Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Praktek Manajemen Laba (Earning Management)

Laporan Keuangan merupakan media komunikasi yang digunakan untuk menghubungkan pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan terhadap perusahaan. Pentingnya laporan keuangan juga diungkapkan bahwa laporan keuangan merupakan sarana untuk mempertanggungjawabkan apa yang dilakukan oleh manajer atas sumber daya pemilik. Salah satu parameter penting dalam laporan keuangan yang digunakan untuk mengukur kinerja manajemen adalah laba.

Menurut Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1, informasi laba merupakan perhatian utama untuk menaksir kinerja atau pertanggungjawaban manajemen. Selain itu informasi laba juga membantu pemilik atau pihak lain dalam menaksir earnings power perusahaan di masa yang akan datang. Adanya kecenderungan lebih memperhatikan laba ini disadari oleh manajemen, khususnya manajer yang kinerjanya diukur berdasarkan informasi laba tersebut, sehingga mendorong timbulnya perilaku menyimpang, yang salah satu bentuknya adalah earnings management.

Manajer mempunyai kewajiban untuk memaksimumkan kesejahteraan para pemegang saham dan debtholders, namun disisi lain manajer juga mempunyai kepentingan untuk memaksimumkan kesejahteraan mereka sendiri. Penyatuan kepentingan pihak-pihak ini seringkali menimbulkan masalah-masalah yang disebut dengan masalah keagenan (agency problem). Manajemen laba merupakan salah satu masalah keagenan yang terjadi karena adanya pemisahan antara pemegang saham dengan manajemen perusahan.

Parameter kinerja perusahaan yang mendapat perhatian utama dari investor dan kreditor dari laporan keuangan adalah laba dan arus kas. Pada saat dihadapkan pada dua ukuran kinerja akuntansi keuangan tersebut, investor dan kreditor harus yakin bahwa ukuran kinerja yang menjadi fokus perhatian mereka adalah ukuran kinerja yang mampu menggambarkan kondisi ekonomi perusahaan serta prospek pertumbuhan dimasa depan dengan lebih baik. Oleh karena itu, selain kedua ukuran kinerja tersebut investor dan kreditor juga perlu mempertimbangkan karakteristik keuangan setiap perusahaan. Karakteristik keuangan yang berbeda-beda antar perusahaan menyebabkan relevansi angka-angka akuntansi yang tidak sama pada semua perusahaan.

Corporate governance merupakan isu yang sedang hangat dibicarakan sebagai suatu alat yang bisa memecahkan masalah dalam pengelolaan dan pertanggungjawaban perusahaan modern. Corporate governance adalah serangkaian mekanisme yang digunakan untuk membatasi timbulnya masalah keagenan. Dengan informasi yang dimiliki, pengelola bisa bertindak yang hanya menguntungkan dirinya sendiri dengan mengorbankan kepentingan pemilik. Hal ini mungkin terjadi karena pengelola mempunyai informasi mengenai perusahaan, yang tidak dimiliki pemilik perusahaan (assymmetric information).

Corporate governance diperlukan untuk mengendalikan perilaku pengelola perusahaan agar bertindak tidak hanya menguntungkan dirinya sendiri, tetapi juga menguntungkan pemilik perusahaan, atau dengan kata lain untuk menyamakan kepentingan antara pemilik perusahaan dengan pengelola perusahaan. Kepentingan utama pemilik dana adalah return yang memadai atas dana yang ditanamkan. Pengelola akan mengutamakan kepentingan pemilik apabila aktivitas yang dilakukan dan keputusan yang diambil ditujukan untuk meningkatkan nilai perusahaan, hal ini berarti juga akan meningkatkan kekayaan pemilik.

Good Corporate Governance secara difinitif merupakan sistem yang mengatur dan mengendalikan perusahaan untuk menciptakan nilai tambah (value added) untuk semua pemegang saham. Ada empat komponen utama yang diperlukan dalam konsep good corporate governance ini, yaitu fairness, transparency, accountability, dan responsibility. Keempat komponen tersebut penting karena penerapan prinsip good corporate governance secara konsisten terbukti dapat meningkatkan kualitas laporan keuangan. Prinsip good corporate governance yang diterapkan dengan konsisten dapat menjadi penghambat aktivitas rekayasa kinerja yang mengakibatkan laporan keuangan tidak menggambarkan nilai fundamental perusahaan.

Manajemen laba adalah pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi oleh manajer untuk mencapai tujuan khusus. Terdapat dua cara yang saling melengkapi dalam berfikir tentang manajemen laba. Pertama, perilaku oportunistik manajemen untuk memaksimumkan utulitasnya dalam kompensasi, kontrak, dan kos politik. Kedua, perspektif kontrak efisien ketika manajemen laba dilakukan untuk menguntungkan semua yang terlibat dalam kontrak. Earnings management sebagai intervensi dalam proses pelaporan keuangan eksternal dengan tujuan memperoleh beberapa kebutuhan pribadi. Earnings management terjadi ketika manajemen menggunakan keputusan tertentu dalam pelaporan keuangan dan penyusunan transaksi-transaksi yang mengubah laporan keuangan hal ini bertujuan untuk menyesatkan para stakeholder tentang kondisi kinerja ekonomi perusahaan, serta untuk mempengaruhi penghasilan kontraktual yang mengendalikan angka akuntansi yang dilaporkan.

Ada tiga sasaran yang dapat dicapai oleh manajer dalam melakukan manajemen laba meliputi: minimalisasi biaya politik (political cost minimization), maksimalisasi kesejahteraan manager (manager wealth maximization), dan minimalisasi kas pendanaan (minimization of financing cost). Berbagai bentuk manajemen laba seperti taking a bath, perataan laba (income smoothing), maksimalisasi atau minimalisasi pendapatan dapat dilakukan oleh pihak manajemen dengan memanfaatkan peluang yang ada dalam standar akuntansi seperti penerapan kebijakan akuntansi atau pemilihan metode akuntansi yang digunakan. Adanya kemungkinan manipulasi ini karena adanya fleksibilitas yang diberikan oleh GAAP dan karena sulit untuk menekankan pelaporan keuangan yang fleksibel.


Manajemen laba adalah suatu tindakan yang dilakukan oleh pihak manajemen yang menaikkan atau menurunkan laba yang dilaporkan dari unit yang menjadi tanggung jawabnya yang tidak mempunyai hubungan dengan kenaikkan atau penurunan profitabilitas perusahaan untuk jangka panjang. Dengan demikian, manajemen laba dapat diartikan sebagai suatu tindakan manajemen laba yang mempengaruhi laba yang dilaporkan dan memberikan manfaat ekonomi yang keliru kepada perusahaan, sehingga dalam jangka panjang hal tersebut akan sangat menggangu bahkan membahayakan perusahaan.

Definisi earnings management menjadi dua, yaitu:

1. Definisi sempit. Earnings management dalam hal ini hanya berkaitan dengan pemilihan metode akuntansi. Earnings management dalam artian sempit ini didefinisikan sebagai perilaku manajemen untuk “bermain” dengan komponen discretionary accruals dalam menentukan besarnya earnings.

2. Definisi luas. Earnings management merupakan tindakan manajer untuk meningkatkan (mengurangi) laba yang dilaporkan saat ini atas suatu unit dimana manajer bertanggung jawab, tanpa mengakibatkan peningkatan (penurunan) profitabilitas ekonomi jangka panjang unit tersebut.
Manajemen laba sebagai suatu intervensi dengan maksud tertentu terhadap proses pelaporan keuangan eksternal dengan sengaja memperoleh beberapa keuntungan pribadi. Manajemen laba terjadi ketika manajer menggunakan judgment dalam pelaporan keuangan dan penyusunan transaksi untuk merubah laporan keuangan, sehingga menyesatkan stakeholder tentang kinerja ekonomi perusahaan atau untuk mempengaruhi hasil yang berhubungan dengan kontrak yang tergantung pada angka akuntansi yang dilaporkan. Manajemen laba merupakan pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi untuk mencapai tujuan khusus.


Ada tiga faktor yang bisa dikaitkan dengan munculnya praktek manajemen laba yaitu:

1. Manajemen Akrual (accruals management). Faktor ini biasanya berkaitan dengan segala aktivitas yang dapat mempengaruhi aliran kas dan juga keuntungan yang secara pribadi merupakan wewenang dari para manajer (managers discretion).

2. Penerapan Suatu Kebijaksanaan Akuntansi yang Wajib. Faktor ini berkaitan dengan keputusan manajer untuk menerapkan suatu kebijaksanaan akuntansi yang wajib diterapkan oleh perusahaan yaitu antara menerapkannya lebih awal dari waktu yang ditetapkan atau menundanya sampai saat berlakunya kebijaksanaan tersebut.

3. Perubahan Aktiva Secara Sukarela. Faktor ini biasanya berkaitan dengan upaya manajer untuk mengganti atau merubah suatu metode akuntansi tertentu diantara sekian banyak metode yang dapat dipilih yang tersedia dan diakui oleh badan akuntansi yang ada (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).


Faktor-faktor yang memotivasi pihak manajemen untuk melakukan manajemen laba adalah sebagai berikut:

1. Alasan Bonus (bonus scheme). Adanya asimetri informasi mengenai keuangan perusahaan menyebabkan pihak manajemen dapat mengatur laba bersih untuk memaksimalkan bonus mereka.

2. Kontrak Hutang Jangka Panjang. Semakin dekat suatu perusahaan ke pelanggan hutang, manajemen akan cenderung memilih prosedur akuntansi yang dapat ‘memindahkan’ laba periode mendatang ke periode berjalan, yang bertujuan untuk mengurangi kemungkinan perusahaan mengalami technical defauld (kegagalan dalam pelunasan hutang).

3. Motivasi Politis (political motivation). Perusahaan besar yang menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak akan cenderung menurunkan labanya untuk mengurangi visibilitasnya, misalnya dengan menggunakan praktik atau prosedur akuntansi, khususnya selama periode kemakmuran tinggi.

4. Motivasi Pajak (taxation motivation). Salah satu insentif yang dapat memicu manajer untuk melakukan rekayasa laba adalah keinginan untuk meminimalkan pajak atau total pajak yang harus dibayarkan perusahaan. Hal ini karena laba sering dijadikan landasan untuk mengambil keputusan, menyusun kontrak maupun penilaian kinerja suatu manajer.

5. Pergantian CEO (Chief Executive Officer). Banyak motivasi yng timbul disekitar waktu penggantian CEO. Contohnya, CEO yang mendekati masa pensiun (tugas akhirnya) akan melakukan strategi memaksimalkan laba untuk meningkatkan bonusnya.

6. IPO (Initial Public Offering). Perusahaan yang baru pertama kali menawarkan sahamnya dipasar modal belum memiliki harga pasar, sehingga terdapat masalah bagaimana menetapkan nilai saham yang ditawarkan. Oleh karena itu, informasi seperti laba bersih dapat digunakan sebagai sinyal kepada calon investor tentang nilai perusahaan, sehingga manajemen perusahaan yang akan go public cenderung melakukan manajemen laba untuk memperoleh harga lebih tinggi atas sahamnya.


Pola manajemen laba dapat dilakukan dengan cara:

1. Taking a Bath. Hal ini terjadi selama periode pada saat terjadinya reorgenerasi, termasuk adanya pergantian CEO baru. Jika manajer merasa harus melaporkan kerugian, maka ia akan melaporkan dalam jumlah yang besar. Dengan tindakan ini manajer berharap dapat meningkatkan laba yang akan datang dan kesalahan atas kerugian perusahaan dapat dilimpahkan kepada manajer lama.

2. Income Minimization. Cara ini mirip dengan taking a bath tetapi lebih halus. Cara ini dilakukan pada saat profitabilitas perusahaan sangat tinggi, sehingga jika periode yang akan datang diperkirakan laba turun drastis dapat diatasi dengan mengambil laba periode sebelumnya.

3. Income Maximization. Dilakukan pada saat laba menurun. Tindakan atas income maximization bertujuan untuk melaporkan net income yang tinggi untuk tujuan bonus yang besar. Pola ini dilakukan oleh perusahaan yang melakukan pelaggaran perjanjian hutang.

4. Income Smoothing. Dilakukan perusahaan dengan cara meratakan laba yang dilaporkan sehingga dapat mengurangi fluktuasi laba yang terlalu besar karena pada umumnya investor lebih menyukai laba yang relatif stabil.


Dengan membagi sampel penelitian kedalam dua kelompok, yaitu kelompok yang memiliki tingkat akrual diskresioner tinggi dan kelompok yang memiliki tingkat akrual diskresioner rendah. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan yang memiliki komite audit dengan mandat yang jelas untuk pengawasan (oversight) dan pemonitoran pelaporan keuangan, proporsi anggota luar (yang bukan anggota manajemen perusahaan) yang tinggi, atau paling tidak memiliki satu pakar keuangan, secara signifikan mengurangi tindakan manajemen laba pada perusahaan tersebut. Penelitian juga menemukan bahwa komite audit yang melakukan rapat lebih dari dua kali tiap tahun memiliki besaran manajemen laba yang rendah.

Penelitian pada 692 perusahaan besar di Amerika Serikat yang diperdagangkan secara publik dan terdaftar dalam S&P 500 31 maret 1992 dan 1993 dengan mengadakan pertemuan tahunan shareholder antara 1 juli 1991 dan 30 juni 1993. hasil studi ini pada akhirnya memberikan suatu kesimpulan bahwa perilaku earnings manipulation yang dilakukan oleh manajemen perusahaan sangat tergantung dengan karakteristik dewan direksi dan jumlah komite audit yang dimiliki oleh perusahaan.

Penelitian mengenai pengaruh praktik-praktik corporate governance pada 34 perusahaan terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta terhadap manajemen laba yang diatur melalui akrual diskresioner. Penelitian ini berhasil menemukan bahwa salah satu mekanisme corporate governance yaitu, kualitas hubungan perusahaan dengan stakeholder berhubungan negatif dengan praktik manajemen laba.

Pegaruh proporsi dewan komisaris dan keberadaan komite audit terhadap manajemen laba, menunjukkan bahwa (a) Proporsi dewan komisaris dan keberadaan komite audit berpengaruh dengan arah negatif secara signifikan dengan aktivitas manajemen laba, ini menunjukkan bahwa proporsi dewan komisaris dan keberadaan komite audit mampu megurangi aktivitas manajemen; (b) Pengaruh dari kepemilikan manajerial dan institusional terhadap aktivitas manajemen laba secara statistis dapat didukung namun dengan arah positif bukan negatif; (c) Variabel auditor terbukti secara signifikan dapat mengurangi aktivitas manajemen laba, dan (d) variabel laverage mempunyai pengaruh dengan arah positif dan signifikan dengan aktivitas manajemen laba.

Prediksi adanya interaksi antara pangsa pasar, kepemilikan institusional dan laverage dengan manajemen laba. Penelitian tersebut megobservasi 81 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta dari tahun 1998 sampai dengan tahun 2000. Hasil penelitian tersebut secara empiris menunjukkan pangsa pasar saja yang berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba.

Pengaruh reputasi auditor, jumlah karyawan direksi, leverage, dan persentase saham yang ditawarkan kepada publik saat IPO terhadap earnings management. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan hanya laverage yang berpengaruh signifikan terhadap earnings management.

Penelitian menguji pengaruh dari mekanisme corporate governance seperti yang disyaratkan oleh Bapepem dalam Bursa Efek Jakarta. Sampel yang digunakan adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta di tahun 2002-2004 sebesar 44 perusahaan. Hasil penelitiannya menunjukkan bahwa komite audit dan kepemilikan institusional dapat berperan sebagai mekanisme good corporate governance dalam membatasi manajemen laba. Sedangkan untuk kepemilikan manajerial dan komisaris independen tidak mampu menjadi mekanisme good corporate governance. Hasil lainnya menunjukkan bahwa ukuran dewan direksi yang lebih sedikit dapat menciptakan mekanisme good corporate governance yang lebih baik.

Penelitian pengaruh mekanisme corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba pada perusahaan CEO. Hasil penelitiannya menunjukkan (1) Kepemilikan manajerial mampu menjadi mekanisme corporate governance pada perusahaan Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), karena hubungan antara kepemilikan manajer dengan manajemen laba berhasil diterima yaitu bahwa manajemen laba yang dilakukan pada periode sebelum Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan kepemilikan manajerial. Semakin tinggi saham yang dimiliki oleh manajemen semakin rendah tingkat manajemen laba yang mungkin dilakukan; (2) Earnings management mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan kepemilikan institusional, bahwa kepemilikan saham oleh intitusi dapat menjadi kendala bagi perilaku opportunistic manajer yang memanfaatkan earnings management untuk kepentingan pribadinya.

Pengaruh manajemen laba terhadap return saham perusahaan dengan kualitas audit sebagai variabel pemoderasi. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa variabel aliran kas operasi, akrual diskresioner, akrual non diskresioner dan interaksi antar variabel akrual diskresioner dengan KAP non Big- 5 secara statistik berpengaruh terhadap return saham perusahaan. Sedangkan pada penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Kusuma dan Sandra (2004) menemukan bahwa audit laporan keuangan tidak untuk mendeteksi terjadinya manajemen laba, tetapi audit dilakukan untuk meningkatkan kredibilitas laporan keuangan.

Ardiati, Aloysia Yanti, 2005. Pengaruh Manajemen Laba Terhadap Return Saham Pada Perusahaan yang diaudit oleh KAP Big 5 dan KAP non Big 5, Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia Vol. 8 No. 3, September 2005.

Ariyoto, Kresnohadi, dkk, 2000, “Good Corporate Governance dan Konsep Penegakannya di BUMN dan Lingkungan Usahanya,” Usahawan, Oktober, No. 10 Tahun XXIX.

Boediono, 2005, “Kualitas Laba Studi Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance dan Dampak Manajemen Laba dengan Menggunakan Analisis Jalur,” Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII, September 2005, Solo.

Choutrou S. Marrakchi, Jean Bedard, and Lucie Courteau, 2001, “Corporate Governance and Earnings Management,” National Bereau of Economic Research, Working Paper.

Daniati, Ninna, Suhairi, 2006, Pengaruh Kandungan Informasi Komponen Laporan Arus Kas, Laba Kotor, dan Size Perusahaan Terhadap Expected Return Saham. Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi IX, 2006, Padang.

Darmawati, Deni, 2003, Corporate Governance dan Manajemen Laba : Suatu Studi Empiris, Jurnal Bisnis dan Akuntansi vol. 5 No. 1, April 2003.

Faisal, 2004, Analisis Agency Costs, Struktur Kepemilikan dan Mekanisme Corporate Governance, Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VII, Desember 2004, Denpasar.

Fidyati, Nisa, 2004, Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance Terhadap Earnings Management pada Perusahaan Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO). Kompetensi, Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Akuntasi Vol. 2 No. 2. Juni 2004.

Gumanti, Tatang Ary, 2000, “Earnings Management : Suatu Telaah Pustaka,” Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan, November, Vol. 2 No. 2.

Healy, P. M. dan J. M. Wahlen, 1998, “A Review of The Earnings Management Literature and Its Implication for Standard Setting,” Working Paper.

Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976, “The Theory of The Firm : Manajerial Behaviour, Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial and Economics, 3 : 305-360.

Klien, A, 2002, “Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristic and Earnings Management,” Journal Accounting and Economics, 33 : 375-400.

Mahmudi, 2001, Manajemen Laba (Earnings Management) : Sebuah Tinjauan Etika Akuntansi, Jurnal Bisnis dan Akuntansi Vol. 3, No. 2, Agustus 2001.

Mangku, I Ketut, 2002, “Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Price Earnings Ratio Perusahaan Manufaktur di Bursa Efek Jakarta,” Janavisi Vol. 5 No. 2.

Mardhiana, Lina, 2006, Analisis Pengaruh Economic Value Added (EVA), Debt to Equity Ratio (DER), dan Market Value Terhadap Return Saham. Skripsi-UNDIP (tidak dipublikasikan).

Meutia, Inten, 2004, Pengaruh Independensi Auditor Terhadap Manajemen Laba Untuk KAP Big 5 dan Non Big 5. Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia Vol. 7, No. 3. September 2004

Nuswantara, Dian Anita, 2004, The Effect of Market Share and Leverage Interaction Toward Earnings Management Practices. Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi, Desember 2004, Denpasar.

Putri, Imanda, Firmantyas, 2006, “Analisis Persamaan Simultan Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional, Resiko, Kebijakan Hutang dan Kebijakan Deviden dalam Perspektif Teori Keagenan,” Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi IX, Agustus 2006, Padang.

Siallagon, Hamonangan dan Machfoedz, Mas’ud, 2006, Mekanisme Corporate Governance, Kualitas Laba dan Nilai Perusahaan. Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi, Agustus 2006. Padang.

Saiful, 2004, Hubungan Manajemen Laba (Earnings Management) dengan Kinerja Operasi dan Kinerja Return Saham di Sekitar IPO, Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia Vol. 7, NO. 3, 2004.

Salno, Hanna Meilani dan Zaki Baridwan, 2000, “Analisis Peralatan Penghasilan (Income Smoothing) : Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi dan Kaitannya dengan Kinerja Saham Perusahaan Publik di Indonesia,” Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia, Januari, Vol. 3 No. 1.

Sandra, Dessy dan Indra Wijaya Kusuma, 2004, Reaksi Pasar Terhadap Perataan Laba dan Kualitas Auditor dan Kepemilikan Manajerial Sebagai Variabel Pemoderasi, Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VII, Desember 2004, Denpasar.

Scott, R. William, 2000, Financial Accounting Theory, 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall Canada Inc, Ontario.

Siregar dan Utama, 2005, “Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan, Ukuran Perusahaan, dan Praktek Corporate Governance terhadap Pengelolaan Laba (Earnings Management),” Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII, September 2005, Solo.

Surifah, 2001, Study Tentang Indikasi Unsur Manajemen Laba Pada Laporan Keuangan Perusahaan Publik di Indonesia. JAAI Vol. 5 No. 1, Juni 2001.

Surya, Indra dan Ivan Yustiavandana, 2006, Penerapan Good Corporate Governance, LKPMK Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia.

Swandari, Fifi, 2004, “Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan terhadap Tingkat Risiko Bank Umum di Indonesia Sebelum Krisis Keuangan,” Kompetensi Vol. 2 No.2.

Syakhroza, Akhmad, 2003, Teori Corporate Governance, Usahawan No. 08 Th. XXXII Agustus 2003.

Tri Gunarsih, 2003, Struktur Kepemilikan Sebagai Salah Satu Mekanisme Corporate Governance, KOMPAK, No. 08 Mei – Agustus 2003.

Wedari, Linda Kusumaning, 2004, Analisis Pengaruh Proporsi Dewan Komisaris dan Keberadaan Komite Audit terhadap Aktivitas Manajemen Laba. Proceeding Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VII, Desember 2004, Denpasar.

Widyaningdyah, Agnes Utari, 2001, Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Berpengaruh terhadap Earnings Manajement Pada Perusahaan Go Publik di Indonesia. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Vol. 3 No. 2, November 2001.

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Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Pengaruh CSR Disclosure Terhadap Earning Response Coefficient

CSR Disclosure Influence On Response Earning Coefficient
(An Empirical Study Of Companies Listed On The Jakarta Stock Exchange)

Pengaruh CSR Disclosure Terhadap Earning Response Coefficient
(Suatu Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Jakarta)

Program Ilmu Akuntansi FEUI


The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the information of Corporate Social Responsibility disclosed in the companies' annual reports on the informativeness of earnings (Measured by earnings response coefficient, ERC). The study hypothesized That there is' the negative effects of CSR Disclosures on the ERC level since the CSR Disclosures Which Provide investors more information is not captured by the accounting earnings. The sample of the study related parties in 108 annual reports in 2005 of the companies listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. The empirical results of the study show That the level of CSR Disclosures has a negative effect on the ERC as Predicted. The results of the study indicate That investors assessed the CSR information in disclosed by the companies on their annual reports for decision on their investment.

KEYWORDS: Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Earning Response coefficient.


Several previous studies showed that the number of companies that do social responsibility disclosure (hereinafter abbreviated as CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility) in its annual reports is increasing. Similarly, the number and type of information that is disclosed increasing CSR (Ernst & Ernst, 1978; Trotman, 1979; Kelly, 1981; Pang, 1982; Guthrie, 1982; Gray, 1990; Gray et al, 1993; Sayekti, 1994). Many companies are increasingly recognizing the importance of implementing CSR programs as part of its business strategy. A global survey conducted by The Economist Intelligence Unit shows that 85% of senior executives and investors from various organizations to make CSR as a primary consideration in decision-making (Warta Ekonomi, 2006). Research Basamalah and Jermias (2005) showed that one reason is the management of social reporting for strategic reasons. Although not yet be compulsory, but it can be said that almost all companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange has disclosed information about CSR in its annual report in a variety of levels (Sayekti, 2006).

From an economic perspective, the company will disclose any information if such information will enhance shareholder value (Verecchia, 1983, in Basamalah et al, 2005). With the adoption of CSR, the company will gain social legitimacy and to maximize long-term financial strength (Kiroyan, 2006). This indicates that companies that use CSR expects to get positive response by market participants. Literature about the existing voluntary disclosure to provide an understanding that the disclosure of such information is used in the valuation and corporate finance firm (Core, 2001).

*Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 Makassar
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Pengaruh Pemisahan Hak Aliran Kas Dan Hak Kontrol Terhadap Dividen

Effect of Rights Separation of Cash Flow And Control Of Dividend Rights
(Pengaruh Pemisahan Hak Aliran Kas Dan Hak Kontrol Terhadap Dividen)

Baldric siregar
STIE YKPN Yogyakarta


The expropriation of minority shareholders by Those of controlling shareholder is the main agency conflict in firms with concentrated ownership. The expropriation is Obvious Pls cash flow rights and control rights are separated through pyramiding and cross-holdings. The ultimate ownership concept is Used to Investigate identify the separation and its implications on dividends. By using the sample consists of the firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange for the period from 2000 to 2004, empirical Evidences That shows the cash flow rights and control rights do not go together but have Different implications.

The concentration of cash flow rights is an incentive to avoid expropriation. Can this be seen from Evidences of positive effects of cash flow rights on dividends. On the other hand, the control rights concentration is an incentive to generate private benefits through expropriation. This conclusion is supported by evidence of the negative effects of control rights on dividends. When control rights Exceed cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders have higher incentive to expropriate by participating in firm's management. The controlling shareholders' participation in management makes Them more freely to generate private benefits. But the incentive is lower Pls help a firm has the second controlling shareholder. The second controlling shareholder cans mitigate the controlling shareholder's incentive to expropriate.

Keywords: expropriation, cash flow rights, control rights, cash flow rights leverage, pyramiding, cross-holding, immediate ownership, ultimate ownership, dividend.

Agency problem is a central issue in financial literature since Berle and Means (1932) investigate the ownership structure of listed companies. In companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders have no control over the management to act in harmony with the interests of shareholders. Principal agency problem in a company like this is the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. But in companies with concentrated ownership, no shareholder can control the management or even part of the management itself. Agency problem that stands out in a company like this is the agency conflict between shareholders pengendali1 with minority shareholders.

Concepts that have been commonly used to identify the existence of concentration of ownership is the concept of ownership imediat.2 imediat ownership concept has a weakness in the study of patterns of corporate ownership because the concept of ownership can not be used to identify the chain of ownership, controlling shareholders, separation of cash flow rights and control rights , and the mechanism of the increase in corporate control (La Porta et al., 1999).

* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Effect of Litigation Risk And Strategies Type (Pengaruh Risiko Litigasi Dan Tipe Strategi)

Effect of Litigation Risk  And Strategies Type Of Relationship Between Conflicts of Interest and Accounting Conservatism

Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang


This research studies for existence and determinant of accounting conservatism, ESPECIALLY related to the conflict of interest considering Between investor and creditor litigation risk manager incentive due typess and firm strategy. The Objectives of this research are: (1) to Investigate the effect of the conflict of interest on accounting conservatism, (2) to Investigate the effect of litigation risk on the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, (3) to Investigate the effect of strategy types on the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism.

Result of the research shows, That there are variation of accounting conservatism, inter-firm level. The first hypothesis testing result shows That conflict of interest influences positively on accounting conservatism. The second hypothesis testing result shows the relations litigation moderate risk "Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, but the moderation of role is weaken. This result is not supported Predicted Hypothesis. The third hypothesis testing result shows the strategy firm types moderate the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism. The result shows Pls Prospector is firm strategy, the positive relations of conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, is weaker. When a defender is firm strategy, the positive relations of conflict of interest and accounting conservatism is Stronger. The result supports Hypothesis Predicted.

This research shows, litigation risk and strategy types Can be assumed as condition That Motivate managers in responding Between the conflict of interest of investors and creditor related to our conservative financial report. Unsupported by the second hypothesis, possible reason for this matter Because of the Weakness of law enforcement in Indonesia, that influence managers in anticipating litigation risk.

Key words: conservatism, the conflict of interest, litigation risks, strategy types


Conservatism is an accounting principle which if implemented will result in the numbers tend to be low income and assets, as well as the numbers tend to be high costs and debt. Such a tendency occurs because the slow recognition of the principle of conservatism as well as accelerate the recognition of revenue costs. As a result, reported earnings tend to be too low (understatement).

Among the researchers, the principles of accounting conservatism is still considered a controversial principle. On the one hand, accounting conservatism is considered as constraints that will affect the quality of financial reporting. On the other hand, accounting conservatism is useful to avoid the opportunistic behavior of managers related to contracts that use financial statements as a media contracts (Watts, 2003).

Developments that occurred exactly show that the existence of the practice of accounting conservatism is increasing. Existence of conservatism practiced each company can be different, because of the various alternative choices of accounting methods. In addition, also caused by the different conditions of their respective companies.

Original Title:

Pengaruh Risiko Litigasi Dan Tipe Strategi Terhadap Hubungan Antara Konflik Kepentingan Dan Konservatisma Akuntansi

* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Effect of accounting conservatism (Pengaruh Konservatisma Akuntansi)

Accounting Conservatism Influence On Equity Appraisal Company By The Good Corporate Governance Be Moderated

Amalia S. Yana DWI FALA, SE, SI M.
Khairun Ternate University


The objective of this study is to determine the influence of accounting conservatism on the assessment of corporate equity valuation and the ABILITY of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in interacting the effect of accounting conservatism to the corporate value. Sample in this research is manufacturing companies listed in the Jakarta Stock That Market for the financial report in 2000-2005 periods. Number of sample is 23 companies with 115 observations. The accounting conservatism, conservatism, the proxy by instrument variables (VIKV2_23). The assessment of corporate proxies by equity market-to-book ratio. The mechanism of Corporate Governance is Measured using the managerial approach of the properties and proportion of commissioner board.
The results showed That accounting conservatism, giving significant positive influence to corporate equity. Proportion of commissioner board as one mechanism of corporate governance as moderating variables That was interacting with relations Between accounting conservatism, corporate value, even in a negative impact. Oppositely, the property was not a managerial That Could interacting variables moderating the relation Between Accounting conservatism and corporate value.
Key words: conservatism, instrumental variable, market-to-book ratio, a corporate governance mechanism.

1.1. Background
Conservatism is a principle which most affect the accounting valuation (Sterling, 1970 in Watts, 2003a). Because of that conservatism today and still have an important role in accounting practices. Conservatism is defined as a concept for delaying the recognition of future cash inflows (Watts, 1993), and as a conservative accounting is generally stated that the accountant should report the accounting information of the lowest of several possible values for assets and income, as well as the highest of several possible value of liabilities and expenses (Hendriksen, 1992).

Lo (2005) defines conservatism as a pessimistic outlook in accounting. Conservative accounting means that accountants be pessimistic in the face of uncertain income or loss by selecting the principles or policies that slow the recognition of revenue, accelerate the recognition of the cost, lowering the valuation of assets and raising debt rating.

In fact there are pros and cons surrounding the application of the principles of conservatism. Critics claimed that the conservatism of this principle led to the financial statements to be biased and so can not be used as tools by the users of financial reports to evaluate corporate risk. Monahan (1999) in Mayangsari and Wilopo (2002) states that the more conservative accounting so the reported book value of equity will be increasingly biased.

Orignal Title:


* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Systematic Risk And Financial Leverage

Analysis Of Cross-Sectional And Temporal Relationship Between Systematic Risk And Financial Leverage

Drs. Ibn Qizam, SE, MSi, Akt.
Faculty of Sharia State Islamic


This research is intended to examine both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally the Correlation Between financial leverage and systematic risk (beta). Financial leverage is usually Considered as one proxy of risk derived from financial data and domain name as one That has Distinctive determinants. Beta, on the other domain, is regarded as one proxy of risk derived from the market That has Some other determinants. That it is the research tries to combine both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally the two domains That most of the accounting Researchers little to devote Themselves.
Cross-sectionally, this result is fail to support Hypothesis 1, that is the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk "Will Be Stronger Pls sizes of the firms are relatively Smaller That the other firms and conversely, the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk" Will Be Pls Stronger is the relatively larger size That the others. Hypotheis 2 (the relation Between financial leverage and systematic risk negatively Will Be Stronger Pls help the firms Belong to a group of relatively more homogeneous industries than the Others, and conversely, the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk positively be less strong will of the firms Pls Belong to a group of relatively less homogeneous industries than the others) and Hypothesis 3b (the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk "Will Be Stronger Pls the significant effect of operating leverage is higher variable) is empirically supported (using interaction models Pls C.1 ). In spite of results the significant, the coefficients of financial leverage, operating leverage, and industry on the game show inconsistent effects Signs. The result, however, is consistent with Sufiyati (1977) `s findings Nowhere Some of her results showed That financial leverage was negatively related to beta.
On the other test, the inter-temporally the result shows, That financial leverage is significantly and symmetrically related to beta. That this means the two variables show bidirectional causality. The high (low) beta cans result in the high (low) financial leverage; and on the contrary, the high (low) financial leverage cans result in the high (low) beta. That means this hypothesis 4a is supported. Nevertheless, the conditioning variables (operating leverage and size) do not significantly influence the causal relations Between the beta and financial leverage.

Key words: Beta (systematic risk), the Financial Leverage, Operating Leverage, Size, Cross-sectional, inter-temporal, bidirectional, interaction model.

I. Background Problem
This research is intended to analyze the cross-sectional and temporal relationship between financial leverage and systematic risk or beta. Financial leverage is usually considered a proxy for risk based financial data company that is usually considered a single domain that has a separate determinant; while on the one hand, that is considered a proxy beta risk sourced from the market which also has its own determinants. But, unfortunately, some researchers have not tried to connect the two proxies of risk by entering a few variables that affect human relations in a more intense both in cross-sectional and temporal.

The first domain of research, namely the determinant of financial leverage analysis, among others, carried out by Gupta (1969), Ferry and Jones (1979), Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) and others. In its findings, issued financial leverage as the dependent variable which is influenced by various independent variables such as size, growth, industry, business risks and others. While research related to determinants of systematic risk and both are trying to connect between the two domains can look back on the findings of Hamada (1972), Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975), Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Bowman (1979, 1981 ), Robichek and Cohn (1974), Melicher and Rush (1974), etc. or financial literature as in Foster (1986).

Original Title:


* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Tuesday, April 27, 2010



Universitas Jember


The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between accounting measures of total firm risk and the level f underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). A number of studies have shown an association between market and accounting betas. However, most of the studies are performed using a sample of large established firms for which both accounting and market betas can be computed. In case of IPO firms, market betas cannot be computed due to the data limitations associated with private firms. Due to limited information available prior to IPO dates, in particular financial reports, one has to use a proxy to measure risk in an IPO. Accounting variables have been prominently known as potential proxy for ex ante uncertainty in an IPO.

Using a sample of 90 IPOs that went public during 1991-1997 at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, this study finds that the level of underpricing is determined by accounting beta, price to book value ratio and price earnings ratio. The IPO issue size has negative but insignificant association with the level of underpricing.

Keywords: Initial public offerings (IPO), accounting beta, ex ante uncertainty, underpricing,

1. Introduction
Theoretical and empirical evidence has indicated that certain accounting measures can be used as proxies for total firm risk, that is, they could determine the riskiness of a corporation (Lev, 1974; Bowman, 1979; DeAngelo, 1990, among others). The literature also suggests that accounting information is relevant in determining the value and thus the riskiness of a corporation through the use of accounting analysis (Brealy and Myers, 1996; Benninga and Sarig, 1997; White et al., 1998, among others). Since most of the information available in the prospectus is accounting information, it is arguable that this information represents a potential source for assessing the quality of the issuing firm.

Some have also advocated the possibility of using accounting information in assessing the value of firm making an IPO (Beaver et al., 1970; Foster, 1986; Lev, 1989; Berstein and Wild, 1998; Noland and Pavlik, 1998). Moreover, Ryan (1997), based on his survey relating accounting numbers and company risk, notes the possibility of incorporating accounting information for measuring the risk of a firm making an IPO in the absence of ex post risk measures prior to the offering. Thus, the focus of the current study is to examine whether accounting measures of total firm risk are associated with the uncertainty surrounding an IPO.


* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Erwin Saraswati
Faculty of Economics, University of Brawijaya


Miles and Snow's strategy firm divide into four types, Which are Prospector, defender, analyzer and reaction, with Prospector and defender as the two extremes. The Objectives of this research are to empirically examine the differences in accounting performance Between Prospector and defender firms and the differences in market reaction as well. Measured by performance are accounting earnings before tax, discontinued operations and extraordinary items, sales growth and dividend payout ratio. Market reaction is proxied by actual cumulative abnormal returns. Sample of this research consists of 60 firms, 33 firms are categorized as prospectors and 27 firms are categorized as Defenders. Data of this research are analyzed using Mann-Whitney U test. The results of this research show That there are no differences in earnings before tax, discontinued operations and extraordinary items, sales growth and market reaction Prospector Between firms and defender firms. On the contrary, this research found That dividend payout ratio of defender firms are higher than dividend payout ratio of Prospector firms, as Predicted.

Keywords: Defender, Prospector, financial performance, market reaction

1. Preliminary
Competitive business world is getting more difficult. Each company must be able to compete in order to survive and maintain the continuity of their business. Marketing strategies become very important, in order to survive in the midst of a rigorous business environment. The management company must be able to determine appropriate strategies for each company.

Olson et al. (2005) divides the marketing strategies into four types, namely prospectors, analyzers, low cost and differentiated Defenders Defenders. Miles and Snow (1978) divided the four typology of corporate strategy, the Prospector, defender, analyzer and reaction. Prospector and defender both interpret as an extreme strategy is different. Prospector is a strategy that identifies and develops new products and exploit market opportunities, while the defender is a strategy that tends to maintain the market that has been achieved and a stable product with low price (low leadership cost).

The purpose of this study was to obtain empirical evidence of differences in market reaction to accounting performance measures on two extreme types of marketing strategies, the Prospector and defender. This research refers to research Habbe (2001) that tests on the differences in accounting performance measures for companies that bertipologi Prospector and defender, and is associated with stock price. Habbe (2001) could not find evidence of a link between the stock price with the company strategy Prospector and defender. Therefore, this study wanted to see the consistency of the results of research Habbe (2001) by testing in the period after the crisis.

Original Title


* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Monday, April 26, 2010

Empirical Study on the Capability (Studi Empiris terhadap Kapabilitas)

Empirical Study of Strategic Capabilities Manufacturing Company in Indonesia

Information Systems FE-UGM


In operations management, strategic capabilities directly influences a company's success factors in competition. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Relationship Between Strategic manufacturing capabilities in Indonesian manufacturing industry. The survey was conducted through Internet-based questionnaire and statistical analysis, particularly structural equation modeling (SEM), was Used to apprehend this concept.

Analysis of the data reveals The quality That is a basis for delivery, Which is the basis for flexibility and cost. Whether flexibility and cost are pursued exclusively or simultaneously, it Seems to be connected with the implementation of certain improvement programs. This common pattern of capability accumulation Can be Used to estimate potential behavior or as a way to perform in an innovative manner.

Keywords: manufacturing capabilities, strategic manufacturing, resource-based view


Corporate strategy can be interpreted as an organizational tool to reach and maintain success. Taken from the Greek strategia, namely the ability to utilize available resources to win a military conflict, corporate strategy is often interpreted by businessmen as the true focus in the competition (Mitreanu, 2006).

Given the competition takes place exclusively at every level, (almost) the entire organization and then fully concentrate on strategic efforts to continuously improve our products and services they offer to customers. The emphasis on competition encourages organizations to deliver ideas and actions that trigger the birth of sustained success.

In the eyes of operations management, corporate strategy is supported and shaped by strategic capabilities. Wheelwright (1984) argues that strategic capabilities in manufacturing companies is the ability to produce: (1) with low cost, (2) with high quality, (3) reliable and quick in delivery, and (4) flexibility in the choice of the combination and volume of products . Is the main occupation of manufacturing companies to develop, nurture, and memandirikan these strategic capabilities. It is expected that positive correlations will appear in strategic decision making and better performance (Roth and Miller, 1990; Swamidass and Newell, 1987).

Original Title:

Studi Empiris terhadap Kapabilitas Strategik Perusahaan Manufaktur di Indonesia

* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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Rachmawati ANDRI
Universitas Sebelas Maret (UNS)


The objective of this study is to examine the influence of Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) and corporate governance mechanism (the audit committee, board of commissioner, managerial ownership, institutional ownership) toward earnings quality and firm value Among manufacturing companies listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange.

The result of this study showed significant influences That IOS have to earnings quality and firm value, managerial ownership and institutional ownership have significant influences to firm value but Did not have significant influence to earnings quality, audit committee and board of commissioner Did not have significant influence to earnings quality and firm value.

Keywords: Investment Opportunity Set, corporate governance mechanism, earnings quality, firm value.

1. Background Problem

According to agency theory, the separation between ownership and management company can cause conflict. Conflict called the agency conflict due to related parties who are principals (who gave the contract or shareholders) and agents (who receive funds under management contracts and principals) have conflicting interests. When agents and principals seek to maximize their own utility, and have different desires and motivations, there is reason to believe that the agent (management) do not always act according to desire principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The idea that the management can take action only provides benefits for themselves based on an assumption that states every person has the self-seeking behavior or self-Interested behavior. Desire, motivation and utilities that are not the same between management and shareholders raises the possibility of adverse action management shareholders, among other things tend to behave unethically and accounting fraud.

Agency conflict can lead to the nature of an opportunistic earnings management reports to maximize his personal interests. If this happens will result in lower earnings quality. Subramanyam (1996) in Siregar and Main (2005) argued that one measure of corporate performance that is often used as a basis for decision-making is the company's profit generated. Earnings are measured on an accrual basis is considered a better measure of company performance than operating cash flows because accruals reduces the time and mismatching problems inherent in the use of short-term cash flow (Dechow, 1994).

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* * Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 - Makassar
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DRA. Zulaikha, M. SI, AKT
Mataram University


Prior research stated Relationship Between That there are information technology and corporate performance, but another research note stated That Relationship Between there are information technology and corporate performance. Most studies have overlooked an intermediate organizational capabilities Important That Mediate the Relationship Between information technology and corporate performance, Standard and Poor 'knowledge management capability. Recent research interest in the knowledge management Phenomenon That indicates knowledge management capability Mediators Between Could be information technology and corporate performance. Research gap motivated to examine the effects of information technology relatedness on corporate performance through the mediation of knowledge management capability.

The current study hypothesizes That complementarity of the four dimensions of information technology relatedness is positively effect on cross-unit knowledge management capability of a firm multibusiness and complementarity of product knowledge management capability, customer knowledge management capability, and managerial knowledge management capability has a positive effect on multibusiness corporate performance of a firm. A survey was mailed (520 questionnaire) to general banks in central Java That proxied by information technology managers and business managers as the research sample. The response rate 27.3% digit with 142 respondents. Used to examine hypothesized Structural Equation Model with the AMOS program.

The result digit that, as hypothesized, information technology has a significant relatedness effect on the knowledge management capability and knowledge management capability, in turn, has significant effects on corporate performance of multibusiness firm, so relatedness That information technology has significant indirect effects on corporate Performace through the mediation of knowledge management capability.

Keywords: relatedness of Information Technology, Knowledge Management Capability, Corporate Performance

Background Problem

Current developments in information technology provides many services on various aspects of business activity (Mc.Leoad RJ, 1997, Indriantoro, 2000). Information technology is part of information systems and information technology refers to technology used in conveying and processing information (Aji, 2005). Information technology has brought fundamental changes to the organization both private and public organizations. Therefore, information technology becomes a very important thing in determining the competitiveness and the ability of companies to improve business performance in the future. Information technology resources to be a good consideration for managers and consultants, in determining a company's success in the future (Devaraj and Kohli, 2003).

The relationship between information technology and corporate performance to be of interest to academics and the practitioners. Several studies have been done by previous researchers found a significant relationship between information technology with corporate performance. Kelley (1994), Siegel and Griliches (1992) in Devaraj and Kohli (2003) states that some of the research found a positive effect of information technology on firm performance at the industry level. Diewert and Smith (1994), Hitt and Brynjoltsson (1995), the Board and Min (1997) in Devaraj and Kohli (2003) indicates that there is a positive relationship between technology and corporate performance.

Original Title :

* The National Symposium on Accounting 10 - Makassar
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